Symposium*
Pre-dispute Arbitration Clauses-Can
They All Be Right?
By JAY

FOLBERG**

CALIFORNIA IS IN the eye of the storm over the enforcement of
pre-dispute arbitration clauses in consumer and employment cases.
These non-negotiated agreements to arbitrate all future disputes, imbedded in contracts that are offered on a "take it or leave it basis,"
curtail any meaningful opportunity to pursue a claim in court and
limit the right to be part of a class action lawsuit. Plaintiffs' attorneys
have long opposed pre-dispute arbitration clauses and, along with
consumer advocates, have lobbied for restrictions on their use. State
legislative and judicial efforts to directly limit the enforcement of arbitration clauses have been thwarted by the shield provided by the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") along with the preemption resulting
from the Supremacy Clause. The California Legislature, aware of the
preemption obstacle and the increasing use of private arbitration,
passed bills that impact the implementation of "mandatory" arbitration by imposing the nation's most strict ethics standards and disclosure requirements on arbitrators and provider organizations. These
requirements have provoked judicial challenges and intense debate
about the use of pre-dispute arbitration clauses in employment and
consumer contracts.
As a self-confessed wobbler on the issue of mandatory arbitration,' I first suggested this symposium topic to the University of San
Francisco Law Review editors and then welcomed the opportunity to
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The author chaired the Blue Ribbon Panel of Experts on Arbitrator Ethics, ap-

pointed by the California Judicial Council, which was mandated by California legislation to
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read the timely articles they received from top scholars on the subject.
Now that I have read these excellent articles, I sympathize with the
judge who, after hearing a good argument by one lawyer, said "yes,
you are right." Then, after hearing the argument of opposing counsel,
said "yes, you are also right." Thejudge's clerk whispered to the judge,
"your Honor, they cannot both be right." The judge responded, "yes,
2
you are right, too."

The articles are summarized by my colleague Josh Davis in his
essay, which follows, and I will not duplicate his effort or attempt to
match his insightful analysis. Jean Sternlight and Stephen Ware appear to know one another's reasoning and arguments as well as Presidential candidates on the debate circuit together who can anticipate
what the other will say. They are each forceful and seem passionate in
arguing why consumer and employment pre-dispute arbitration
clauses should or should not be enforced. Can two eminent and
knowledgeable scholars be addressing the same issue when they come
to such different conclusions? Professor Sternlight in her article, The
Rise and Spread of Mandatory Arbitration as a Substitute for the Jury Trial,

zeroes in on the constitutional right to a jury trial and the strict requirements for waiver of that important safeguard. Professor Ware, in
his response, focuses on the FAA and preemption. He too is opposed
to "mandatory arbitration" but defines voluntary and mandatory differently from Sternlight.
At the risk of sounding like the above described ambivalent
judge, they could both be right. Sternlight is narrowly focused on
what an employee or consumer is potentially giving up. She would
encase that decision with protection standards judicially created for
the waiver of the right to ajury trial under the federal and state constitutions. Sternlight juxtaposes the right to ajury trial with the privately
imposed mandate to use arbitration. Ware focuses more broadly on
what the consumer or employee is getting by contracting for goods,
services, or a job, and he supports the current judicial approach, in
both federal and state courts, of only allowing more limited contract
defenses as grounds to invalidate pre-dispute arbitration clauses. He
contrasts the decision to accept a pre-dispute arbitration clause, even
create the arbitrator ethics standards. In this capacity, he served as a mediator between
those for and against pre-dispute arbitration clauses.
2. This story takes many forms from multiple sources. Most memorable is the version told by Judge Daniel Weinstein (Ret.), who attributes the story to his father, a Rabbi,
when explaining the rabbinical avoidance of imposed judgments. Daniel H. Weinstein,
You're Right, Too or Why Mediation is Very Jewish (1992) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the author).
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on a take it or leave it basis, with the choice of doing without the
goods or services or particular job, or paying more for the choice of
how disputes will be resolved. (My thinking may be influenced by Josh
Davis's analysis that the differences between Sternlight and Ware can
be explained by her view of mandatory arbitration as a trial substitute
and Ware's view of pre-dispute arbitration clauses as a dispute settlement device.) Each is correct in how they reason within their frame of
reference or focus and given where they start. Of course it would be
easier to side with Ware if there were no Seventh Amendment or
equivalent state constitutional provisions, and with Sternlight if there
were no Federal Arbitration Act and Supremacy Clause. However,
these contradictory anchors do exist and pull their arguments in opposite directions.
Lewis Maltby, in his article, Employment Arbitration and Workplace
Justice, does not side directly with either Sternlight or Ware, nor does
he address the Seventh Amendment and FAA-preemption issues. He
asks, not necessarily referring to Sternlight and Ware, how attorneys
with similar values can see the increased use of employment pre-dispute arbitration clauses in such opposite ways? Maltby believes the answer lies in their different perceptions of how well our judicial system
provides work place justice. Although he states that "[a] rbitration as a
condition of employment is wrong, and should be opposed," he appears to either assume Sternlight and Ware are both right (or both
wrong). More accurately, his article addresses access to a forum and
justice for workers, rather than legal rights. In effect, he cuts through
the theory and asks "arbitration compared to what?" Maltby answers
this question by comparing the results of arbitration to litigation, from
an employee's perspective, and finds that arbitration compares favorably. His most powerful conclusion, even if reached through extrapolation of quantifiable data, is that pre-dispute arbitration clauses double
the number of employees able to actually pursue a claim.
Pre-dispute arbitration clauses in consumer and employment
cases are no longer "one-size fits all" single agreements to arbitrate.
They are drafted by sophisticated attorneys who have incorporated
into these clauses multiple waivers of remedies and procedural options. Professor David Schwartz in his article refers to these exculpatory provisions as "remedy-stripping" clauses. Professor Schwartz
begins where Sternlight and Ware stop. He assumes, for purposes of
his article, that the consumer or employee's basic waiver of the right
to trial is enforceable and that the resulting arbitration award on the
merits of the claim will have the force of res judicata. This is how
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arbitration works and why it is the subject of debate in this symposium. When the contract clause includes purported limitations on the
nature of otherwise available claims, remedies, and procedures, does
the completed arbitration preclude a court from considering the matters not arbitrated? In other words, if the clause limits a dismissed
worker to actual damages for breach of the employment contract and
expressly precludes any other damages or remedies, at law or in equity, even if provided by statute, does the arbitration award have res
judicata effect on the tort or statutory claims, and remedies not arbitrated? Schwartz argues that courts should give the compelled arbitration "the narrowest preclusive scope that is consistent with established
preclusion principles." He includes a separate analysis of why class actions limitations should not collaterally estop a successful plaintiff in
arbitration from litigating classwide liability. So, Professor Schwartz
may side with Professor Sternlight, but offers litigation hope for consumers and employers, even if Ware is right and Sterrilight is not.
Ruth Glick provides an arbitrator's perspective on the new California legislation resulting from the proliferating use of pre-dispute
arbitration clauses. As mentioned earlier, California has, in its own
way, partially dealt with the FAA and preemption issues by legislating
arbitrator ethics and disclosure requirements, which are most strict
when applied to what Glick refers to as "imposed arbitration." (The
national response to this California approach has confirmed that
some consider California to be a national trend setter, while others
view the state as a laboratory for bad government and weird ideas.)
True to her exemplary neutrality as a respected arbitrator, Glick
neither supports nor defends the imposition of pre-dispute arbitration
clauses but does recognize it as a problem. She reports on the practical effect of the new arbitrator ethics standards promulgated by the
California Judicial Council and arbitrator reactions to them, as well as
on the court challenges based on preemption by the FAA and by the
Securities and Exchange Act. Glick observes that although ethics standards may seem "to balance the inequities of non-negotiated contracts," they create unintended consequences for consumers/
employees and "destabiliz[e] non-consumer arbitrations as well." She
suggests several possible solutions that Sternlight and other critics of
mandatory arbitration might agree to, like opt-in or opt-out provisions, as a type of deferred consent. Of course, she recognizes that
those who impose arbitration clauses would not find these options satisfactory, but she offers other ideas and encourages more thoughtful
deliberation, so as not to further destabilize commercial arbitration.
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Well, even if all the contributors to this symposium cannot all be
right, we know that the decision of the editors of the University of San
Francisco Law Review to convene this symposium was right. Both the
live symposium and this printed version have contributed to the dialogue and literature on this timely and important subject.

6

UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

